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 ___________________________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________________________________    
 
    
WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge. 
 
 The Board of Directors of City Trusts [Board] appeals the 
district court's order finding that the Board and Girard College 
[College] were included in a certified class involving a 
nationwide class action suit against Uniroyal and numerous other 
defendants in regard to the presence of asbestos in public and 
private schools.  Because the district court found the appellants 
                     
 
    *.  The Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., United States 
Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
were members of the class, the Board was enjoined from pursuing 
its own state asbestos lawsuit against Uniroyal.  The district 
court held that the Board, as a member of the class, was bound by 
the Uniroyal settlement, and under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2283, it was necessary in aid of the court's 
jurisdiction to enjoin the appellant's state court action.  The 
Board appeals. 
 I.   
 The Board was created by a Pennsylvania statute in June 1869 
to act as a trustee in administering a number of estates and 
trusts for the benefit of the City of Philadelphia.1  The estate 
involved here is the Estate of Stephen Girard, which came into 
existence in 1831.  The Girard Estate is the largest estate and 
                     
     
1The Board's powers are statutorily defined as follows: 
 
  All and singular the duties, rights and powers of the  
 city of Philadelphia, concerning all property and   
 estate whatsoever, dedicated to charitable uses    
 or trusts, the charge or administration of which is now  
 or shall hereafter become vested in or confined to the  
 city of Philadelphia, shall be discharged by the said  
 city through the instrumentality of a board composed of  
 fifteen persons, including the mayor of said city,  
 the presidents of the select and common councils for  
 the time being, and twelve other citizens appointed as  
 hereinafter provided, to be called directors of city   
 trusts, who shall exercise and discharge all the duties  
 and powers of said city, however acquired, concerning   
 any such property appropriated to charitable uses, as well 
as the control and management of the persons of any orphans or 
others, the objects of such charity, to the extent that the same 
have been or hereafter may be, by statute law or otherwise, 
vested in or delegated to the said city for the officers thereof. 
 
 Act of June 30, 1869, P.L. 1276, 53 P.S. § 16365, repealed 
in part, Act of November 19, 1959, P.L. 1526. 
  
trust owned and administered by the Board.  After making numerous 
gifts to various institutions and individuals, Mr. Girard devised 
and bequeathed his entire residuary estate to the City of 
Philadelphia in trust for the creation of an "orphan 
establishment."  In furtherance of the deceased's wishes, Girard 
College was established as an institution for orphan children in 
Philadelphia.  The Board acts as trustee in managing the Girard 
Estate and the College.  The Board also manages approximately 110 
other estates and trusts, which it administers according to the 
wishes of its benefactors.    
 Girard College initially admitted only white male orphans, 
but has since expanded its admission criteria to include all 
minorities and children not considered orphans in the traditional 
sense (only one absent parent).2  The primary mission of Girard 
College is to act as a guardian to orphaned children by providing 
for their full development and nurturing needs.  Pursuant to this 
mission, the orphans not only receive food, clothing, health care 
and a caring place to live, but in addition, the Board provides 
them with an education at the College through grade twelve.  Most 
children live on the school grounds only through the school year, 
while some remain all year.  Except for Girard College, the Board 
                     
     
2The Philadelphia Orphans' Court oversees certain aspects of 
Girard College.  Only children who qualify as orphans under the 
definition established by the Orphans' Court may be admitted to 
Girard College.  See e.g., 20 Pa. Stat. §§ 711, 712, 722, 7142. 
  
does not own or operate any estate or trust which requires the 
Board to provide educational services to children incident to its 
primary mission of administering estates and trusts pursuant to 
its statutory and fiduciary duties.  
 Therefore, due to the Board's unique status in reference to 
Girard College, many regulatory statutes do not apply, including 
the Pennsylvania Public School Code.  The Board in the past, 
however, has voluntarily chosen to follow various regulatory 
standards to protect and benefit the orphan children.  In 1988, 
and in compliance with the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act 
[AHERA], 15 U.S.C. § 2641 et seq., the Board voluntarily 
submitted an "Asbestos Management Plan."  The Board submitted the 
Plan on AHERA forms and listed Girard College as an "LEA."3 
 In 1983, the first case was filed in regard to asbestos in 
public and private schools.  In 1984, under the Federal Rules of 
                     
     
3
"LEA" stands for local educational agency, which is defined 
as "a public board of education or other public authority legally 
constituted within a State for either administrative control or 
direction of, or to perform a service function for public 
elementary or secondary schools in a city, county, township, 
school district, or other public subdivision of a State, or such 
combination of school districts or counties as recognized in a 
State as an administrative agency for its public elementary or 
secondary schools."  20 U.S.C. § 2891(12). 
  
Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3), the district court certified, and 
the Third Circuit affirmed, the following class: 
  All entities which own or operate in whole or in part  
 any public educational facilities, as defined in  
 Section 198(a)(10) of the Elementary and Secondary  
 Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 2854, throughout the  
 United States; and all entities which own or operate in  
 whole or in part any non-public, non-profit elementary  
 or secondary educational facilities, including entities  
 with religious affiliations, in the United States, to  
 the extent that such non-profit entities are owned or  
 operated by one or more non-profit corporations or  
 associations no part of the net earnings of which  
 inures, or may lawfully inure, to the benefit of any  
 private shareholder or individual. 
 
Pretrial Order 20.  See also In re Asbestos Litigation, 104 
F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).   
 
 In 1988, the class definition was amended and limited to 
exclude certain schools which were operated by the states: 
  The definition of the litigation class certified in  
 this matter is limited and excludes any elementary or  
 secondary facilities owned or operated by Ohio or  
 Maryland or any other state as a service incidental to  
 the provision by the state of other substantial  
 services. 
 
Pretrial Order 110. 
  
 Shortly after the class was certified, a "Notice of Class 
Action Relating to School Asbestos Claims" was mailed nationwide 
to all schools included on a list generated by a market data 
retrieval organization.  The list was not modified to include 
only the schools that were members of the certified class.  
Girard College appeared on the list as a "private school."  The 
Board has no records indicating it received this notice or opted 
out of the class.  The Notice provided that if you did not opt 
  
out of the class by December 1, 1987, you would be bound by any 
class judgment.   
 In September 1991, plaintiff members of the class and 
Uniroyal entered into a Settlement Agreement releasing Uniroyal.  
This notice was also sent to Girard College.  In December 1991, 
the district court entered final judgment approving the Uniroyal 
Settlement.   
 In February 1994, the Board instituted a state court action 
against Uniroyal as well as various architects, contractors and 
engineers.  The Board of Directors of City Trusts v. Ballinger & 
Associates et al., January Term, 1994, No. 3346.  The Board 
sought recovery for property damages to certain buildings and 
other structures it owns and operates caused by the presence of 
asbestos products and materials.  The buildings in the state 
action include Girard College and other commercial buildings 
located in Girard Square, a city block in Philadelphia.  Uniroyal 
moved for an order restraining the Board from litigating its 
claims on the basis that the Board is bound by the Uniroyal 
settlement.  In a pretrial order, the district court granted the 
motion and held that Girard College was a member of the certified 
class and therefore enjoined under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2283,4 from maintaining a state action against Uniroyal.  
The district court held: 
                     
     
4Section 2283 provides: 
 
  A court of the United States may not grant an   
  injunction to stay proceedings in a State except as  
  expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where  
  
   In this Court's opinion, the Board of City Trusts 
  is a local education agency.  It is both public and  
 private.  By statute of the Commonwealth of  
 Pennsylvania, it has been created as a City agency.   
 The delegation of the supervision of the Board of City  
 Trusts rests with the Orphans' Court.  It is through  
 the City of Philadelphia that that Trust was to be  
 administered.  
 . . . 
 
   It is public in the sense that its actions are  
 actions of the -- are state action[s].  It is private  
 in the sense that it was private money that caused  
 the college or other charitable functions to be  
 established and maintained.  But it was through the  
 public arm that that intent was to be carried out.  So,  
 it is a -- as private money going through a state- 
 created agency for the education and the associated  
 growth of young people into adulthood. 
 
   The Board of City Trusts has identified itself as 
  a local education agency in the AHERA compliance  
 document.  It has identified itself in various briefs  
 as an arm of the City.  That statute which created the  
 Board of City Trusts shows that it is -- it was created  
 as an agency of Philadelphia.  It has all the character  
 of a local education agency.   
 
 The Board appeals the district court's finding that it is a 
member of the certified class and is thereby enjoined from 
pursuing its state court asbestos action against Uniroyal et al. 
 II. 
 The district court's application of the class certification 
to the Board requires plenary review since it involves the 
application of the law to the facts.  Levendos v. Stern 
Entertainment, 909 F.2d 747, 749 (3d Cir. 1990).  Similarly, the 
review of the district court's decision to enjoin the Board's 
(..continued) 
  necessary in the aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect 
  or effectuate its judgments. 
  
state court action under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
2283, is also a question of law that requires plenary review.  
1975 Salary Retirement Plan v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 405 (3d Cir. 
1992); see also Carey v. Pennsylvania Enterprises, Inc., 876 F.2d 
333, 337 (3d Cir. 1989); Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889, 891-92 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
 III. 
 A class must be clearly defined and only members can be 
legally bound by settlements or judgments in the class action.  
In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).  The parties agree that the 
initial class certification by the district court can be further 
divided into two subclasses.  Sub-section [1] of the 
certification order includes all public educational facilities as 
defined by Section 198(a)(10) of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965; and Sub-section [2] includes non-public, 
non-profit elementary or secondary facilities to the extent they 
are owned or operated by one or more non-profit corporations or 
associations.5  The district court found that Girard College was 
                     
     
5As mentioned, Pretrial Order 110 amended the initial class 
certification.  The 1988 amendment excludes any "elementary or 
secondary school facilities owned or operated by any state as a 
service incidental to the provision by the state of other 
substantial service."  Because we find Sub-section [2] is the 
relevant section, whether or not the Board is excluded under 
Pretrial Order 110 need not be reached. 
  
a quasi-public and quasi-private educational facility because it 
was created by the state but funded with private money.  It is 
not disputed, however, that Girard College is excluded from Sub-
section [1] of the class certification because it is not a public 
school as defined by Section 198(a)(1) of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965.  Appellees argue that the Board 
is a non-profit association that owns and operates Girard 
College, a private educational facility within the definition of 
Sub-section [2].  The Board contends, however, it is not a non-
profit association, but a state-created agency and Girard College 
is a charitable trust created by the residuary estate of Stephen 
Girard's Will.  If the Board is a non-profit association, the 
Board is within the class certification and enjoined from 
pursuing its state court action.  If, however, the Board is a 
state-agency or at least not a non-profit "association", it is 
not within the class and the Board may maintain its state court 
action against Uniroyal.  Both sides competently argued their 
positions and attempted to aid this court in its determination of 
this complicated issue.   
 The relevant part of the class certification, Sub-section 
[2], states: 
  [A]ll entities which own or operate in whole or in part 
  any non-public, non-profit elementary or secondary  
 educational facilities, including entities with  
 religious affiliations, in the United States, to the  
 extent that such non-profit entities are owned or  
 operated by one or more non-profit corporations or  
 associations no part of the net earnings of which   
 inures, or may lawfully inure, to the benefit of any  
 private shareholder or individual. 
 
Pretrial Order 20 (emphasis added). 
  
 
 The center of the dispute focuses on the common usage of the 
term "association."  The Board argues it is a state agency 
because it was created by a Pennsylvania statute in 1869.  
Further, the Board contends that the United States Supreme Court 
in Pennsylvania v. The Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230, 231 
(1957), previously found the Board to be a "state agency."  That 
case was a race discrimination claim brought against Girard 
College.  The Court held that for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the actions of the Board were state actions.  Id. at 
231.  The appellees counter that the finding by the Supreme Court 
that the Board is a state agency for state action purposes is 
different from finding that the Board is an agent of the state in 
the present asbestos litigation.  The appellees also point out 
that in the Board's briefs in previous cases, the Board has 
labeled itself as an "arm of the City."  The district court also 
labeled the Board as a "City Agency" because it was created for 
the City of Philadelphia and it is through the city that the 
trust is to be administered.  As a preliminary matter, we doubt 
that the Board is a city agency.  The Board was created by the 
state for the purpose of administering charitable bequests left 
to and for the benefit of Philadelphia.  Although the Board 
performs this function for the city, it is neither a part of the 
city nor responsible to the city.  The Board was designed merely 
to independently carry out this service for the city whenever the 
city is left sizable estates that require management.  The 
Philadelphia Home Rule Charter Section A-100(a)(3) also 
  
explicitly exempts the Board from any relationship with the 
city.6  The Board of Directors of City Trusts appears, therefore, 
not to be a city agency.   
 The issue then turns on whether the Board is a state agency 
and if not, whether it can be labeled a non-profit association.  
The appellees argue that the term "association" is broad enough 
to include the Board of Directors of City Trusts.  As defined by 
Black's Law Dictionary, association means "[t]he act of a number 
of persons in uniting together for some special purpose."  
Black's Law Dictionary 121 (6th ed. 1990).  The appellees view 
the Board as a group of fifteen members united for the special 
purpose of administering trusts bequeathed to the City.  The 
appellees contend that to find the Board is not an association 
would be to contort the common usage of the term.  The appellants 
maintain it can not be an association because it is an agency of 
the state.  The composition of the Board is too unique to resolve 
the issue by merely labeling it as an association. 
 We must look to state law in defining the structures and 
powers of non-profit corporations.  Federal Election Comm'n v. 
National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 204 (1982).  Under 
Pennsylvania law, it remains unclear as to the meaning of a non-
                     
     
6Section A-100(a)(3) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter 
provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this 
charter shall not apply to the Board of Directors of City Trusts 
and to any institutions operated by it." 
  
profit association.  The only statute that comes close to 
defining the term is 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8332.1, which 
concerns non-profit associations in relation to a manager, coach, 
umpire or referee negligence standard.7  The Board of Directors 
of City Trusts would not seem to fit within this definition.  At 
all events, we find that for another reason the Board of 
Directors of City Trusts cannot be an association.  The appellees 
want to label the Board an association while acknowledging that 
Girard College is a charitable trust.  However, in reality, the 
two are not distinct legal entities.  It is stretching the 
contours of the framework in which the Board was established to 
label the Board as an association when the Board is acting as a 
trustee on behalf of a charitable trust.  To call the Board an 
association, would be really calling Girard College an 
association, which it clearly is not.  As is demonstrated in this 
suit, to sue Girard College, you must sue the Board of Directors 
                     
     
7The statute defines "nonprofit association" as: 
 
  An entity which is organized as a nonprofit corporation 
  or nonprofit unincorporated association under the laws 
  of this Commonwealth or the United States or any entity 
  which is authorized to do business in this Commonwealth 
  as a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated  
 association under the laws of this Commonwealth,  
 including, but not limited to, youth or athletic  
 associations, volunteer fire, ambulance, religious,  
 charitable, fraternal, veterans, civic, county fair or  
 agricultural associations, or any separately chartered  
 auxiliary of the foregoing, if organized and operated  
 on a nonprofit basis. 
 
 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8332.1(d). 
  
as its trustee.  The Supreme Court appeared to use a similar 
analysis when it found the Board to be a state agency.  Although 
it was Girard College which had discriminated against the 
African-Americans in refusing to admit them to the orphanage, the 
Court found the Board was acting as a trustee based on the power 
and authority given to it by state law, and therefore responsible 
under the Fourteenth Amendment for the College's action.  Here 
the Board is bringing the suit (rather than defending against 
one), but it is still acting only as a trustee on behalf of 
Girard College.  The Board has the authority to sue and may be 
sued pursuant to the state statute which created the Board.  
Although the context of the present litigation is different from 
the context of the previous Supreme Court suit, the Board acts 
only as a trustee of Girard College and therefore the same 
analysis is applicable.  Finding that the Board is not an 
association, it is not included within the certified class and 
the appellants may proceed with their state court asbestos 
litigation along with the many others who are also not included 
in the class against Uniroyal et al.  Therefore, the district 
court must be REVERSED. 
 ______________________________ 
